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COPYRIGHT WRONG: THE UNITED STATES' FAILURE
TO PROVIDE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR WORKS
OF ARCHITECTURE
Congress protects drawings, prints, and other works relative to archi-
tecture under the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act).' Under the
Copyright Act's pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works clause, courts
protect architectural plans, drawings, and models against unauthorized
duplication. 2 The United States Copyright Act does not, however, prevent
the duplication of the actual architectural structures. 3 Lobbying efforts to
remedy the United States lack of structural protection for architecture
recently have increased in response to the United States accession to the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne
Convention or Berne). 4 The Berne Convention is an international copyright
1. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988)) (including pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
as protectable subject matter in § 102 of Copyright Act). Section 101 of the Copyright Act
defines pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works as including diagrams, models, and technical
drawings, including architectural plans. Id.
2. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1988) (stating in § 102 that pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works are protectable as subject matter under Copyright Act of 1976 and defining
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" clause in § 101 to include architectural drawings
and plans); J. HAZARD, COPYRIGHT LAW iN Busnss & PRACTICE, 2-18 n.51 (1989) (stating
that § 102 of Copyright Act of 1976 protects architectural blueprints and drawings under
section's pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works clause). But see Imperial Homes Corp. v.
Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that architectural plans are copyrightable
as writings, not pictorial works, under Copyright Act of 1976).
3. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1879) (holding in dispute over reproduction
of similarly styled bookkeeping ledgers that copyright law protects description of work of art,
but not idea that actual work of art represents); Shipley, Copyright Protection for Architectural
Works, 37 S.C.L. REv. 393, 395 (1986) (stating that United States copyright law protects
architectural drawings, but not structures that drawings depict). In Baker the Supreme Court
stated that copyright protects the description of a work of art, but not the work of art itself.
Baker, 101 U.S. at 105. The Baker Court considered whether a copyright on ledger books
gives the author exclusive rights to the peculiar system of bookkeeping that the ledgers depict.
Id. at 101. The author in Baker contended that the copyright on the author's ledger prevented
others from using similarly ruled lines and headings. Id. To resolve the issue, the Court
examined the relationship between copyright protection and that of letters-patent. Id. at 102-
03. The Court reasoned that published descriptions of art, illustrations, or diagrams are subject
to copyright benefit, but not the art itself. Id. at 104-05. According to the Court, only letters-
patent law can protect the art itself. Id. at 105. Consequently, copyright alone does not grant
exclusive right to the author's bookkeeping system. Id. at 107. Courts have extended the Baker
holding to deny protection to architectural structures. See infra note 13 (citing courts' denial
of architectural protection for residential structures based on Baker holding).
4. See generally Comments Submitted in Response to Notice of Inquiry, Copyright in
Works of Architecture, Report of the Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, Library
of Congress (June 1989) (reproducing comments that public submitted to Copyright Office for
Office's consideration in favor of and opposed to adoption of architectural copyright protec-
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convention that affords protection for architectural structures, including the
right to prohibit modification or distortion of an architect's work.' Admin-
istered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Berne
Convention has been in effect since 1886, with the United States acceding
to the Convention in 1989.6 The United States joined the Convention,
however, without amending the United States Copyright Act to comply with
Berne provisions that afford protection for architectural structures. 7 There-
fore, in response to the lobbying efforts for increased protection of archi-
tectural structures and to bring the United States into international compliance
with the Berne Convention, the Copyright Office outlined four policy
options to provide for United States protection of architectural structures.'
Unfortunately, the Copyright Office failed to offer a satisfactory proposal
for protection of architectural structures because the Copyright Office
tion). United States accession to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works prompted a Copyright Office report on current deficiencies in architectural
copyright. Id. at 2-4. In anticipation of resulting United States architectural protection, the
Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation already has submitted copyright applications for selected
Wright designs, including New York's Guggenheim Museum. Proposal to Include Architectural
Works Under Copyright, 18 LIRR. HoTinm 4 (1989).
5. See DuBoff, Caplan, Gerdes, & Victoroff, The Berne Convention: New Dimensions
in Copyright, 12 L.A. LAW. 41 (1989) [hereinafter DuBoff, Caplan] (stating that Berne
Convention is oldest and most elaborate international treaty governing protection of copyright);
Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention,
reprinted in 33 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 183, 260 (1986) [hereinafter Preliminary Report] (stating
that Berne includes works of architecture as protectable subject matter). Article 2(1) of the
Berne Convention includes as protectable subject matter "works of drawing, painting, archi-
tecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography" and "illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and
three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science." Id. Article
2(1) of the Convention thus obligates member countries to protect works of architecture, plans
and sketches, and architectural models. Changes in Law Called for to Protect Architectural
Works, 48 LIRR. CONG. IN omATIoN BuLL. 234 (1989); see infra note 169 (discussing Berne
Convention protection of moral rights, including architect's right to prohibit modification or
distortion of architect's work).
6. See R. BENIO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RiGiTs, IssuEs AND CoNTRo-
vWRsms 5 (1987) (stating that Berne Convention has been in effect since 1886); DuBoff, Caplan,
supra note 5, at 41 (stating that United States accession to Berne became final on March 1,
1989).
7. See generally Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
§ 9, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (failing to amend United States Copyright Act to bring United
States copyright law into compliance with Berne standards by granting protection to works of
architecture).
8. See Copyright in Works of Architecture, The Report of the Register of Copyrights,
United States Copyright Office, Library of Congress 1 (1989) [hereinafter Copyright Office
Report] (outlining domestic and international copyright protection for works of architecture
and suggesting four policy options to bring United States into international compliance). In
the United States House of Representatives, Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman
of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice,
requested a Copyright Office report on current United States protection for works of archi-
tecture. Id. at 1. Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Science
and Technology and a member of the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks,
requested the same report in the Senate. Id.
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proposals either offer a level of protection beyond that which the United
States Congress can tolerate or below that which American architects desire. 9
Consequently, even if Congress adopts any of the Copyright Office's pro-
posals, United States protection of architecture may remain at a level
insufficient to protect adequately domestic architecture or to bring the
United States into compliance internationally.
Currently, the United States copyright law protects works relative to
architecture, including blueprints, drawings, and models.10 The United States
Copyright Act includes pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works as protect-
able subject matter." The Copyright Act includes architectural plans and
drawings in the definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.' ' 2
Courts, however, have held that this umbrella of protection does not extend
to architectural structures.1 3 Consequently, architects must seek protection
for their creations through the inadequate remedies of design patent law,
trademark law, or the common-law remedies of unfair trade practice.1 4
Most nations, however, provide copyright protection to an architect
seeking to guard against duplication, modification, and distortion of the
9. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing United States refusal to recognize
broad paternity rights in artistic works, focusing instead on limited economic rights). See
generally infra notes 26-117 and accompanying text (discussing four Copyright Office proposals
for architectural protection).
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (protecting drawings, models, and architectural plans
under pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works clause of Copyright Act); also supra notes 1-2
and accompanying text (describing protection of works relative to architecture under pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works clause of Copyright Act).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
12. See id. § 101 (defining "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" to include diagrams,
models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans).
13. See Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 86 (6th Cir. 1967) (holding that
no copyright infringement exists where builder uses plans to construct building, absent actual
copying of those plans); also Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir.
1972) (holding that copyrighted architectural plans do not grant plans' author with exclusive
right to construct structure plans depict); Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F.
Supp. 928, 941 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that unauthorized use of copyrighted architectural
plans to construct shopping center was not copyright violation); DeSilva Constr. Corp. v.
Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1962) (holding that copyright law does not extend
to protection of structure or building itself, but limits protection to plans only). See generally
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding that work is protectable but not idea that work
represents). The denial of structural protection in Scholz, Schuchart, Imperial, and DeSilva
results from the Baker holding that although a work is protectable, the idea that the work
represents is not protectable. Shipley, supra note 3, at 417 n.122. For example, in Scholz
Homes v. Maddox the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit first suggested
that although architects might desire protection against the unauthorized use of their plans,
Baker created uncertainty that such protection exists. Scholz, 379 F.2d at 85-86. The Scholz
court indicated that no copyright infringement existed if the infringer used plans to construct
a building rather than to communicate to others how one could construct the building that
the plans depict. Id.
14. See infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text (discussing alternative avenues of
protection for architectural structures).
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architect's structural creations.15 Additionally, the premier instrument on
international copyright, the Berne Convention, has provided for such ar-
chitectural protection since 1908.16 Of eighty-four Berne member nations
that the Copyright Office surveyed, only three, excluding the United States,
do not provide protection for structural works of architecture in the member
nation's own copyright statutes. 7 The Berne member nations that provide
architectural protection make express reference in the members' copyright
laws for protection of buildings and structures.' Prompted by United States
accession to Berne in March 1989, proponents of architectural protection
have advocated a statutory amendment to the United States Copyright Act
to bring the United States into international compliance by explicitly pro-
tecting architectural structures against duplication and modification.' 9
In considering whether to amend the United States Copyright Act to
offer a Berne level of protection for architectural works, Congress requested
a report from the Copyright Office detailing current protection for archi-
tectural works and the need for additional protection.20 The report concluded
that the Berne Convention requires copyright protection for works of
architecture beyond that now available under United States law. 21 The report
further stated that the Copyright Office supports appropriately drafted
legislation to make United States law consistent with the international
standards of Berne.? Finally, the Copyright Office outlined for congressional
consideration four possible solutions to remedy the lack of protection for
works of architecture. 23 None of the four proposals, however, offers a
15. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing international protection for
works of architecture under Berne Convention).
16. See Preliminary Report, supra note 5, at 264 (stating that Berne Convention granted
protection to works of architecture in 1908 Berlin text).
17. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 158 (identifying Belgium, Greece, and
Spain as only three countries that Copyright Office surveyed that do not statutorily provide
for architectural protection).
18. Id. at intro. xxi; see, e.g., Art. 3, Law No. 57-298 of 1957 (protecting architecture
in France); Art. 10 (I)(V), Law No. 48 of 1970 (protecting architecture in Japan); Art. 3 (I)(b),
Act of 1956 (protecting architecture in United Kingdom).
19. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1988) (omitting copyright protection for architectural
structures against either modification or duplication); supra note 4 and accompanying text
(detailing current calls to extend copyright protection compatible with Berne Convention to
works of architecture).
20. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at Appendix A (reproducing letter from
Rep. Kastenmeier to Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights, requesting that Copyright Office
prepare report on current levels of United States architectural protection and compatibility
with Berne levels of architectural protection); also supra note 8 (discussing requests for
Copyright Office Report in United States House of Representatives and United States Senate).
21. Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at xxii.
22. Id.; see Changes in Law Called for to Protect Architectural Works, 48 LEBR. CONG.
INFORMATION BuLL. 234 (1989) (stating that Copyright Office supports appropriate amendments
to Copyright Act to bring United States into compliance with Berne).
23. See generally Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 223-26 (outlining deficiencies
in United States copyright protection for architectural works and suggesting four possible
solutions).
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pragmatic solution for architectural protection in light of the prevailing
attitudes concerning United States copyright law because the scope of
protection is too broad to meet Congressional standards. 24 If architects hope
to derive any protection from United States courts, Congress instead must
adopt an approach to architectural protection narrower than the broad plans
for protection that the Copyright Office proposes. 25
The first option of the Copyright Office report proposes to create a
new Copyright Act subject matter category expressly protecting architectural
structures as works of architecture. 26 According to the Copyright Office,
Congress easily can implement this first option by adding "architectural
structures" to the Copyright Act's definition of "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works," which already protects architectural drawings, plans,
sketches, models, designs, and sculptures. 27 Three bills have addressed the
creation of a new subject matter category for architectural structures. 28 All
three bills propose to include in the Copyright Act "architectural works"
24. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (stating that United States copyright
protection focuses on economic and property rights).
25. See infra notes 145-68 and accompanying text (suggesting limited protection approach
to provide copyright protection for works of architecture).
26. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1988) (detailing subject matter protection of United States
copyright under Copyright Act); Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 223-24 (describing
first Copyright Office option to protect architectural structures). According to the Copyright
Office report, the first option to provide additional protection to architectural structures
requires that Congress consider the exact nature of the buildings that the creation of a new
subject matter category would cover, the nature of any limitations on the exclusive rights that
the new category would grant, the nature of specific moral rights protection that the new
category would grant, and the nature of any remedies for infringement. Id.
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining current copyright protection under pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works clause, including architectural plans, but not structures); see
generally Kerochan, Comments on Discussion Bill and Commentary Prepared for the April
15 Subcommittee Meeting as a Proposed Draft of Implementing Legislation to Permit U.S.
Adherence to Berne, 10 CoLuM. J.L. & ARTs 693 (1986) (commenting on Copyright Office's
preliminary draft of legislative provisions designed to revise Copyright Act to make United
States adherence to Berne Convention possible). Kerochan believes that the creation of a new
subject matter category for architectural structures, such as the Copyright Office suggests in
the first option, might infringe on patent law domain. See id. at 698 (concluding that Congress
would have no difficulty in recognizing architectural works as copyrightable subject matter
with limiting language in area of patent domain). Kernochan thus states that § 113(a) of the
Copyright Act, limiting the exclusive rights of copyright holders, should contain the phrase
"or primarily functional elements or features" to keep architectural copyright from infringing
on patent law domain. Id. at 698.
28. S. 1301, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) [hereinafter S. 1301]; S. 1971, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter S. 1971]; H.R. 1623, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter
H.R. 1623]; see The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Hearings Before the
Senate Subcomm. on Pat., Copyright & Trademark of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Implementation Act Hearings] (statement of Ralph Oman,
Register of Copyrights) (detailing bills S. 1301 and S. 1971); also Copyright Office Report,
supra note 8, at 223 (suggesting H.R. 1623 as satisfactory legislation to provide architectural
protection). Senator Leahy sponsored bill S. 1301 to amend the Copyright Act. Implementation
Act Hearings, supra, at 1. Senator Hatch sponsored the Reagan administration bill, S. 1971,
to amend the Copyright Act. Id.
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as protectable subject matter.29 However, architectural works protection
under the Berne Convention not only protects the structures against dupli-
cation, but also against modification, distortion, or destruction.30 Conse-
quently, two of the bills that propose this Berne level of protection also set
forth several limitations that narrow the scope of an architect's exclusive
rights to prevent modification or distortion of the architect's creations. 3'
Defining and limiting an architect's exclusive rights to prevent modifi-
cation or distortion is the point at which the first option fails to offer a
satisfactory solution. Architects expect copyright law to afford protection
against alterations in the architect's design that would detract from the
desired aesthetic effect.32 Inherent in this protection against alterations is
the concept of moral rights.33 Moral rights include the right of an artist to
claim paternity of, and a right of respect in, the artist's work.34 The right
of paternity includes the right of the artist not to have the artist's name
attached to a work that the artist does not acknowledge.35 The right of
respect, or right of integrity, recognizes a continuing relationship between
29. See Implementation Act Hearings, supra note 28, at intro. (discussing proposal of
S. 1301 and S. 1971 to create "architectural works" clause in Copyright Act to provide
architectural copyright protection); Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 223 (discussing
proposal of H.R. 1623 to protect architectural works under Copyright Act). Two bills
introduced to amend the Copyright Act, S. 1301 and S. 1971, both propose to amend 17
U.S.C. § 101 to add a definition of architectural works. Implementation Act Hearings, supra
note 28, at 12. Both bills also propose to include architectural works in the pictorial, graphic
and sculptural works clause of 17 U.S.C. § 102. Id.
30. See infra note 169 (discussing moral rights protection under Berne Convention,
including protection against modification, distortion, or destruction of artistic work); see also
Implementation Act Hearings, supra note 28, at 13 (proposing new § 119 setting forth several
limitations on exclusive rights of architects to prevent modification or demolition).
31. S. 1301, S. 1971, supra note 28; see Implementation Act Hearings, supra note 28,
at 13 (discussing limitations under S. 1301 and S. 1971 on architect's exclusive rights to
prohibit modification or distortion of architect's work). Two bills that propose to amend the
Copyright Act, S. 1301 and S. 1971, favor a limitation clause to protect the right of an owner
to make alterations to a building to enhance utility. Implementation Act Hearings, supra note
28, at 13. Senator Leahy's bill, S. 1301, also would reserve to the building owner the right of
demolition. Id. The administration's bill, S. 1971, would not extend copyright protection to
processes or methods of construction. Id.
32. See Comments of the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation to U.S. Copyright Office
Notice of Inquiry on Architectural Work Protections, at 6, reprinted in Copyright Office
Report, supra note 8, Appendix C (stating that courts should grant remedies for mutilation
or other alterations of architectural structures that fall within moral rights protection under
Berne Convention).
33. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing protection of architects'
moral rights to safeguard their works against such alterations as modification, distortion, or
destruction).
34. See E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT; INTLICTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE 52 (1980) (discussing moral rights protections under international law, including
paternity rights and right of integrity).
35. See DuBoff, Artists' Rights: The Kennedy Proposal to Amend the Copyright Law,
7 C~ARozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 227, 228 (1989) (discussing Senator Edward Kennedy's 1987
proposal to grant tight of paternity to all American artists).
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the artist and the artist's creation.3 6 This right of respect allows the artist
to prevent the alteration, mutilation, or destruction of the artistic work.
37
However, United States copyright law does not grant paternity or integrity
rights in any artistic work, focusing instead on the economic and property
rights of the work's current owner. 3s In fact, United States efforts to adhere
to the Berne Convention first waned after the 1928 Rome text of Berne
offered moral rights protection. 39 And, in 1988, to ensure that the contro-
versial issue of moral rights would not prevent the United States from
joining the Berne Convention, Congress adopted the legislative strategy of
keeping the issue of moral rights separate from the enabling legislation
permitting United States adherence to the Berne Convention.
4
0
The Copyright Office proposes to minimize the first option's inclusion
of moral rights protection by imposing appropriate limitations on an ar-
chitect's rights. 4' The Copyright Office report suggests limitations on an
architect's exclusive rights such as granting a building owner the right to
make technical alterations to the building. 42 Two of the three proposed bills
include limitations on an architect's exclusive rights such as allowing an
owner to make alterations to a building to enhance utility, reserving to the
owner the right of demolition, and limiting architectural protection to a
building's artistic character. 43 Any limitation of an architect's exclusive
rights, however, is an unsatisfactory compromise because the limitation
either strips a building's owner of the owner's property rights in the building
or else fails to protect an architect from distortion of the architect's work.
An additional problem with the option of granting subject matter
protection to works of architecture is determining the proper remedy."4
36. Id. at 228.
37. Id.
38. See R. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RiGm, IssUEs AND CoNTRo-
vERsias 6 (1987) (analyzing current problems with United States trademark, copyright, and
patent laws considering new technologies and evolving international standards, including fact
that United States protections focus on property rights whereas international protections
recognize moral rights); also Preliminary Report supra note 5, at 215-16 (concluding that 17
U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988), giving copyright owner right to prepare derivative works.based upon
copyrighted work, is closest that United States comes to offering moral rights protection).
39. DuBoff, Caplan, supra note 5, at 41.
40. See Schwartz, The National Film Preservation Act of 1988: A Copyright Case Study
in the Legislative Process, 36 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 138, 139 (1989) (stating that, to avoid
controversy that might prevent United States accession to Berne, Congress deliberately failed
to address moral rights protection in Berne enabling legislation).
41. Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 224.
42. Id.
43. See S. 1301 and S. 1971, supra note 28 (suggesting paternity right protection for
architects' works, with necessary limitations); see also supra notes 30-31 and accompanying
text (expressing need for limitations on architect's exclusive rights).
44. See S. 1301 and H.R. 1623, supra note 28 (suggesting that tension exists in attempt
to provide remedy for copyright infringement on architectural structures without encroachment
on building owners' property rights or on public domain). To preserve a building owner's
property rights and to insure benefit to the public domain, S. 1301 includes limitations under
1109
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Possible remedies for architectural infringement include destruction of the
infringing building, injunction against further construction, or monetary
damages. 45 However, each of these possible remedies has problems.4 For
instance, courts would promote economic waste by permitting the destruction
of a sound, albeit infringing building.47 Additionally, courts may not be apt
to grant an injunction against further construction merely on the suspicion
that the structure might infringe upon completion s.4  Furthermore, remedies
such as injunctions and demolition could cause dislocations in the construc-
tion industry. 49 Finally, measuring monetary damage to an architect's rep-
utation or economic interests by infringement is difficult, if not impossible.
50
Consequently, the first option that the Copyright Office proposes is unsat-
isfactory.
the bill's § 119 on the copyright owner's exclusive rights in architectural works. S. 1301, supra
note 28. For instance, the bill does not include the right of the copyright owner to prevent
the making, distributing, or public display of pictorial representations of the structure. Id.
Also, the bill does not entitle the copyright owner to obtain an injunction to restrain the
construction or use of an infringing building, if construction has substantially begun. Id.
Further, the copyright owner may not obtain a court order requiring that an infringing building
be demolished or seized. Id.; see also Copyright Office Report supra note 8, at 224 (suggesting
limitation of injunctive relief against building construction and limitation on destruction of
building as possible remedies).
45. See supra note 44 (suggesting possible theories to remedy copyright infringement of
architectural structures, including injunction against further construction and demolition of
infringing structures); Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 223 (stating that copyright
statutes of other Berne nations have general infringement provisions for damages except that
injunction generally is not available once construction of alleged infringing building has begun,
and courts may not order demolition of infringing buildings as remedy).
46. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (discussing disadvantages of potential
remedies for copyright infringement).
47. See supra notes 44-45 (expressing reluctance of legislators to permit destruction of
infringing buildings because of economic waste involved).
48. See Demetriades v. Kaufman, 680 F. Supp. 658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying
injunctive relief against alleged infringement of copyrighted plans). In Demetriades the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered whether the owners
of a house could enjoin the defendants from constructing a house substantially similar to the
owners' custom house on the same street. Id. at 659-61. In constructing the duplicate home,
the defendants used the original builder's plans and photographs of the original house. Id. at
660. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), the
court found that although courts grant an owner of copyrighted architectural plans the right
to prevent the unauthorized copying of those plans, that individual does not obtain a protectable
interest in the useful article the plans depict. Id. at 665-66. Consequently, the court enjoined
defendants from using the copyrighted plans. Id. at 666. The court did not, however, enjoin
the defendants from constructing the house. Id.; see also supra notes 44-45 (discussing legislative
reluctance to allow injunctions against construction of allegedly infringing buildings).
49. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 225 (suggesting that architectural
protection could cause dislocation in construction industry); Id. at 116 (reproducing suggestion
of United States Representative Moorhead that architectural protection without limitations on
remedies could compromise practices in construction industry); Id. at 110 (stating that architects
rely on free expression of ideas in public domain).
50. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (stating that copyright protection focuses
on artists' economic and property rights, rather than reputation, therefore making monetary
calculation of infringement difficult).
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The second Copyright Office proposal suggests its own remedy against
architectural infringement.5' The proposal extends protection of the copy-
righted blueprints to prohibit the prints' unauthorized use.52 Currently, in
the United States, an architect's copyright on plans does not prevent a
person from constructing a substantially identical dwelling. 3 The second
option gives the copyright owner the right to prohibit unauthorized use of
the original plans to construct substantially similar buildings.5 4
The Copyright Office report concludes that this second option partic-
ularly will aid smaller architectural firms that are more likely to have others
copy their works.5 5 However, while the Copyright Office correctly concludes
that the major incidents of copying occur from residential duplication and
not from major office complexes and sophisticated structures, the small
scale designer also is more susceptible to copying absent use of the original
blueprints, a problem that this option does not address.16 Whereas dupli-
cation of a technical building requires use of the original blueprints, one
can duplicate a house from varied sources.57 Yet the second proposed option
merely prevents duplication through the use of the original blueprints.
5
Accordingly, duplication still may occur if the duplicator uses other methods.
In one case, a court permitted duplication of a "Chateau" model house
through the use of a floor plan in the developer's advertising brochure.
5 9
In another, a court observed that a person could study a house, draw up
51. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 224 (suggesting as second proposal
for structural protection that copyright owner retain right to prohibit unauthorized construction
of substantially similar buildings based on owner's copyrighted plans).
52. Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 224.
53. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing copyright protection under
Baker for architectural plans, but not for structures plans depict).
54. Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 224. The American Institute of Architects
favors the Copyright Office proposal to permit the owner of copyrighted blueprints to prevent
construction of substantially similar buildings based on those blueprints. Id.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Imperial Homes v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding
that copyrighted architectural plans do not clothe plans' author with exclusive right to construct
houses plans depict); Demetriades v. Kaufman, 680 F. Supp. 658, 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that copyright in plans does not extend to design of house without design patent
protection); Herman Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1053-54 (E.D. Mich. 1973)
(holding that copyright of house plans cannot prevent construction of home plans depict
through use of floor plans in advertising brochure); DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F.
Supp. 184, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1962) (holding that copyright law does not extend protection to
residential structure, but only to copyrighted plans).
57. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing cases that permit architectural
duplication from floor plans in brochures, from reconstruction of original plans, and from
observation of completed structure).
58. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 224-25 (outlining Copyright Office's
second proposal to protect architecture by limiting use of original blueprints).
59. See Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding
that, while copyright did protect against reproduction of floor plan from architectural drawings,
copyright did not protect against use of floor plan as depicted in advertising brochure).
1111
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1103
plans, and construct the same dwelling. 60 Thus, while the second option will
prevent the unauthorized use of copyrighted plans, the option will not
prevent the unauthorized copying of structures through other means. 6'
Therefore, the second option does not sufficiently safeguard architects
desiring structural protection.
The effectiveness of the second option also is contingent upon an
architect discovering an attempt at unauthorized duplication. 62 The proposal
does nothing to aid small architectural firms that are less likely than larger
firms to discover an infringement.63 For example, a duplication of the
Guggenheim Museum is more susceptible to discovery than the copying of
a "Chateau" model house. Consequently, the second option falls to offer
a consistent solution for architectural protection. Therefore, Congress should
not adopt the Copyright Office's second proposal.
The third solution that the Copyright Office proposes is to amend the
definition of "useful article" in the Copyright Act to provide copyright
protection for articles having a utilitarian purpose. 4 Presently, the Copyright
Act excludes protection of articles with a utilitarian purpose. 65 The Act
affords protection to the design of a useful article only if, and only to the
extent that, the design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features
separate and independent from the utilitarian aspects of the article.6 The
Copyright Office denies protection to architectural structures as utilitarian
articles by employing a separability test. 67 Under the separability test, the
60. See DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1962)
(holding that copyright only restricts unauthorized copying of plans).
61. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (stating that one can duplicate archi-
tectural structures through reconstruction of original plans or by using floor plan in advertising
brochures).
62. See Demetriades v. Kaufman, 680 F. Supp. 658, 662-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting
claim by homeowner that construction of similar house on same street was copyright infringe-
ment of plaintiff's house). In Demetriades, plaintiff brought suit only because plaintiff, living
on the same street as the alleged infringing structure, was able to discover the duplication.
See id. at 660 (relying on plaintiff's own discovery of alleged infringement).
63. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at intro. xii (stating that smaller
architectural firms rely on single-family dwelling projects and not more notable structures such
as office buildings, health care facilities, or multi-family dwellings); supra note 62 (exemplifying
unlikelihood of discovering copies of single family dwellings).
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining "useful article" as article having intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray appearance of article or to convey information);
Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 225 (proposing to amend definition of useful article
under title 17 to exclude unique architectural structures).
65. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (excluding protection under Copyright Act of pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works with utilitarian purpose).
66. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1988) (identifying pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
as copyrightable subject matter); Sandison, The Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright
Convention: The American Experience, 11 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 89, 114 (describing separability
test protection for design of article with utilitarian purpose).
67. See Shipley, supra note 3, at 419 (1986) (suggesting that Copyright Office limits
architectural protection by applying separability test of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
clause to deny protection to articles with utilitarian purpose).
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Copyright Office will not register an industrial design unless the design
contains some artistic characteristic that is separable from the utility of the
structure. 6 Currently, courts utilize the separability test to determine pro-
tectable subject matter under the pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
clause of the Copyright Act. 69 Congress emphasized that courts must exercise
the separability test in determining artistic protection versus uncopyrightable
industrial design.70 Accordingly, the only structures currently receiving cop-
yright protection are purely nonfunctional structures such as monuments or
structures with separable, copyrightable artistic features. 7'
In its third proposal, the Copyright Office suggests that Congress could
amend the definition of "useful article" to exclude unique architectural
structures. 72 As a result, the present separability test no longer would deny
copyright protection to unique architectural structures as utilitarian articles
and, thus, unique architectural structures would receive copyright protec-
tion 3. 7 The Copyright Office argues that if Congress would exclude unique
architectural structures from the useful article exception, the Copyright
Office could protect the overall shape of a building if the design is original
within the meaning of copyright law. 74 The Copyright Office further argues
that, by limiting the protection only to unique architectural structures,
Congress could minimize the impact of the copyright amendment and avoid
68. J. HAZARD, COPYRIGHT LAW IN Busnmss & PRACTCE 2-19 (1989).
69. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1988) (granting subject matter protection to article's design
separate from article's utilitarian purpose under pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works clause
of Copyright Act); see, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc., v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411,
418 (2d Cir. 1985) (protecting utilitarian article only to extent that article incorporates some
element that is separable from utilitarian aspects of that article); Norris Indus., Inc. v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 923-24 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying separability
test to grant copyright protection only to design elements of article separable from useful
elements of article); Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980)
(offering copyright protection for product only if product contains some element separable
from utilitarian aspects of article). Because United States courts generally consider most works
of architecture as useful articles, the separability test only aids architectural structures if the
structure incorporates "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural" features that are identifiable separately
from the utilitarian aspects of the building. Sandison, supra note 66, at 114.
70. See H.R. RP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976) (emphasizing separability
as test for copyright protection under title 17).
71. See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936) (stating
that monuments are analogous to sculptural works of art and, thus, subject to copyright
protection); also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976) (describing purely
nonfunctional or monumental structures as subject to full copyright protection); Shipley, supra
note 3, at 425 (concluding that only monuments and other purely nonfunctional structures
currently are receiving copyright protection).
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining "useful article" under current Copyright Act);
Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 225 (proposing to amend definition of useful article
in Copyright Act to exclude unique structures). The Copyright Office defines a unique structure
as a single copy construction from a given set of plans. Copyright Office Report, supra note
8, at 225.
73. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 225 (proposing to exclude Copyright
Act's denial of protection under separability test for unique architectural structures).
74. Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 225.
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possible dislocations in the construction industry caused by copyright pro-
tection of utilitarian designs. 75 Also, according to the Copyright Office, the
third proposal protects unique structures as the structures most deserving
of architectural protection.
76
The problem with the third option is that the proposal leaves a broad
class of architectural structures without protection.7 7 The "most" deserving
structures, such as a Transamerica Tower with its pyramid design, are also
the least likely for a builder to attempt to copy without the original plans.
However, a less unique building, such as a "Chateau" model house, is
more likely for a builder to attempt to copy without the original plans.
Consequently, the small scale designer that the Copyright Office felt com-
pelled to protect in the second option is left without recourse under the
third option because the Copyright Office is less likely to find the small
scale design subject to protection as a unique structure. 78 Thus, the third
option is simply not broad enough to provide adequate protection for the
architectural industry.
Another problem with the third option is the option's apparent overlap
with design patent law caused by excluding the separability test from unique
structures. 79 Congress devised the separability test to prevent copyright
encroachment on design patent law domain.8 0 Patent law addresses the
inherent problems in protecting works of architecture by protecting structural
design apart from a structure's artistic features."' Patent law seeks to reward
an architect for innovative design by granting monopoly protection without
removing advancements from the public domain.12 For example, the Patent
Office does not want to grant monopoly protection on suspension girders
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 225 (suggesting that those seeking
protection for broad class of architectural structures would not favor Copyright Office's third
option).
78. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (expounding benefits of Copyright Office's
second option's protection for smaller architectural finms).
79. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (discussing goals of design patent law
versus copyright).
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982) (granting patent protection to design of article); H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976) (emphasizing need for separability test to
distinguish copyrightable artistic protection from patentable industrial design protection); see
also Milch, Protection for Utilitarian Works of Art: The Design Patent/Copyright Conundrum,
10 CoLum. J.L. & ART 211 (1986) (discussing tension that exists between copyright and patent
when utilitarian article includes artistic features).
81. See White, Standing on Shaky Ground: Copyright Protection for Works of Archi-
tecture, 6 COLtrM. J.L. & ARTs 70, 74 (1981) (discussing inherent tension of enacting patent
legislation that encourages creativity by offering economic incentives through design monopoly
without infringing on copyright protection of creativity).
82. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982) (providing protection for new, original, and ornamental
designs under patent law); also U.S. PATErN AND TRADmAIU OFFicE, MAA.L OF PATENT
ExAsmmNG PRocEDtR § 1502 (5th rev. ed. 1989) (interpreting design protection under 35
U.S.C. § 171 (1982)).
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that might serve the public benefit, or on glass enclosure systems that are
beneficial to all buildings." The dilemma is to enact legislation protecting
designs of architectural structures without diminishing architectural advance-
ments in the public domain.8 Currently, to receive patent protection the
design must be novel, and the standard of novelty is exceedingly high.85
Consequently, design patent protection is difficult to obtain. 86 The Patent
Office will reject a design if the application is merely a modification of an
existing design.87 By eliminating the separability test and relegating design
protection decisions to the more readily obtainable protection of copyright,
copyright law might deprive the public of access to ideas and beneficial
contributions.88 Public comments submitted to the Copyright Office similarly
argued that a large facet of architecture involves the compilation of useful
ideas from other architectural sources.89 Revoking the protection of the
separability test that Congress emphasized and that the courts apply could
prove disastrous to the industry by granting monopoly protection to bene-
ficial design methodsY° In sum, the third option is not broad enough and
encroaches on patent law domain. Consequently, Congress should not adopt
the third option.
The fourth option of the Copyright Office is to do nothing and allow
the courts to develop new legal theories of protection under existing federal
statutory and case law. 91 The option presupposes that attitudes on intellectual
property are evolving with United States accession to Berne and that federal
courts are on the forefront of this change in attitudes, waiting to thrust
83. See White, supra note 81, at 74 (discussing problems of patent precluding public use
of beneficial designs).
84. Id.; see also infra note 88 and accompanying text (expressing view that inherent
tension exists in patent law between protecting rights of ownership and allowing access to
ideas).
85. See White, supra note 81, at 74 (discussing difficulty in obtaining patent protection
as opposed to copyright protection). Generally, patentable designs must embody a "new,
original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture" and must meet the requirements
of novelty, originality, and nonobviousness. Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 64; see
also infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (analyzing difficulty in obtaining design patent
law protection).
86. See White, supra note 81, at 74 (stating that design patent protection is difficult to
obtain).
87. White, supra note 81, at 74.
88. See generally Morris, Expanding Proprietary Entitlements and the Public Interest in
Dissemination of Art, 7 CA~wozo ARTS & ETrr. L.J. 269 (1989) (discussing tension inherent
in copyright law between rights of ownership and public access to ideas).
89. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at Appendix C (comment of Francis X.
Aryan) (opining that field of architecture relies on copying other works).
90. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976) (containing separability test
that Congress recommended courts employ); supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing separability test for copyright protection of articles with utilitarian purpose). See
generally Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at Appendix C (comment of Francis X.
Aryan) (emphasizing architectural industry's reliance on copying to certain extent).
91. Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 225-26.
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protection upon architectural structures.92 The Copyright Office report con-
cludes that novel theories for extending protection to works of architecture
abound under federal law.93 These theories include protection under design
patent law, unfair competition common law, trademark law, and the sep-
arability test of copyright law. 94 The Copyright Office believes that these
legal theories will permit the courts to develop architectural protection based
on fact-specific circumstances. 95 The Office, however, admits that the fourth
option leaves open the possibility of inadequate and conflicting theories of
protection for architectural works9 because United States courts, as well as
the Patent and Trademark, and Copyright Offices, have been reluctant to
grant protection to architectural structures under any of the Copyright
Office's alternative legal theories. 97 For example, present architectural pro-
tection under the alternative theory of design patent law is difficult to
obtain.9 The design must be novel and the standard of novelty is exceedingly
high.99 Similarly, the federal courts offer little protection to works of
architecture under the alternative of common-law protection of unfair
92. See id. at 225 (stating that alternative theories for providing architectural protection
exist under federal law). The Copyright Office report expresses the belief that novel theories
for extending protection to works of architecture abound under federal law. Id. The report
states that Congress could permit the courts to review these novel theories in light of Berne
adherence. Id.
93. Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 225; see supra note 92 (expressing Copyright
Office's opinion that methods of protecting architectural structures abound under federal law).
94. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 63-69 (analyzing various avenues of
protection for architectural works other than copyright); supra notes 66-68 and accompanying
text (detailing separability test protection for works of architecture); White, supra note 81, at
74 (suggesting alternative theories for protection of architectural structures). See generally
Note, Protecting Architectural Plans & Structures with Design Patents and Copyrights, 17
DsAE L. REv. 79 (1967) (describing design patent as an alternative source to copyright for
architectural protection).
95. Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 225.
96. Id. at 225-26.
97. See infra notes 98-117 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacies of architectural
protection under patent law, trademark law, common law, or copyright law); Copyright Office
Report, supra note 8, at 13-14 (analyzing case history in United States concerning copyright
protection for works of architecture). In analyzing the history of the United States courts on
protection for works of architecture, all cases that the Copyright Office found held that a
work of architecture is not a copy of the plans. Id. Courts in six cases held that a copyright
in plans does not extend to the structure depicted therein. Id. The Copyright Office found no
cases that squarely presented the issue of a claim to copyright in a work of architecture. Id.
According to the Copyright Office, courts, being disposed not to protect buildings, have found
other ways besides copyright enforcement to punish deliberate infringers. Id.
98. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of obtaining
design patent protection for architectural works). According to the Copyright Office, in addition
to the difficulty of obtaining a patent, the relatively short design patent term, 14 years, may
be inadequate to satisfy proponents of architectural protection. Copyright Office Report, supra
note 8, at 64.
99. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing stringent requirements of
patent law drafted to encourage advancements without depriving public).
1116
1990] COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR ARCHITECTURE
competition.'00 Although the common law protects the "passing off" of a
person's work for that of another, the test for unfair competition severely
limits the test's application.' 0' The test for protection is whether the structure
so resembles another that the public will mistake the defendant's work for
that of the original architect.lce Cases meeting that standard are exceedingly
rare.1
0 3
In an equally number of rare cases, United States trademark law,
another alternative theory of architectural protection, has offered protection
to distinctive architectural works. 104 The test for protection under trademark
law is whether the public perceives the structure as an identification of the
merchant's goods or services. 05 In proper cases, courts have held that a
uniquely designed building can serve as a trademark.'0 The report of the
Ad Hoc Committee on Berne Adherence, however, concluded that the
trademark avenue of protection is not sufficiently analogous to copyright
protection to offer the copyright level of protection that architects desire
for their works.
07
A final existing legal theory for architectural protection is through the
copyright separability test. 0 8 Currently, the only copyright protection avail-
able for works of architecture is under the "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
100. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text (discussing common-law protection of
unfair trade practices); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1986) (providing statutory unfair competition
protection). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988), provides broad
statutory unfair competition coverage in addition to the limited common-law protection of
unfair trade practices. Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 65.
101. See White, supra note 81, at 74 (stating that common law protects passing off of
artist's work for that of another artist).
102. Id. at 74.
103. Id.
104. See In Re Port-a-Hut, Inc., 183 U.S.P.Q. 680, 682 (P.O.T.M.T. App. Bd. 1974)
(denying trademark protection to applicant's portable steel sheds because sheds were essentially
functional and utilitarian in character). But see Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 65-
67 (suggesting that trademark protection is possible for certain works of architecture). The
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988), provides for trademark protection. Copyright
Office Report, supra note 8, at 65.
105. See In Re Port-A-Hut, at 681-82 (applying consumer identification test to satisfy
trademark protection requirements for applicant's portable building, but denying trademark
registration because building was primarily utilitarian); White, supra note 81, at 74 & nn.81-
83 (discussing In Re Port-A-Hut test for architectural trademark protection).
106. See Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1245 (D. Kan. 1977) (allowing
Fotomat Corp. to enforce trademark of its Fotomat booths); Fotomat Corp. v. Houck, 166
U.S.P.Q. 271, 272-73 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1970) (allowing Fotomat Corp. to enforce trademark of
its Fotomat booths). Proper cases for trademark protection of architectural structures typically
involve configurations of shapes and colors, in conjunction with the name or logo of a
company, that establish a link in the consumer's mind between the service and the structure.
Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 65.
107. Preliminary Report, supra note 5, at 264 (1986).
108. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (outlining copyright protection for
artistic features of utilitarian article under separability test).
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works" clause of the Copyright Act.' 9 Under this clause, the Act protects
a work of architecture only to the extent that the work incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that courts can identify separately from the
work's utilitarian aspects.110 Because the Act does not protect articles with
a utilitarian purpose such as buildings, courts apply the separability test to
determine the specific elements of an architectural structure that can receive
copyright protection under the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works clause.,'
Under current copyright law, adornments or embellishments to a building
can receive copyright protection, but the structure, as a useful article, is
not eligible for copyright protection." 2 However, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania considered a nonfunctional
architectural structure, a memorial monument, analogous to a sculptural
work and afforded the structure full copyright protection."3 Hence, the
Copyright Office will protect the Washington Monument and artistic features
of buildings displaying gargoyles or decorative inlays. 114 In contrast, the
streamlined contours of the United Nation's plaza, having no identifiable
design conceptually different from the building's utilitarian function, does
not have access to copyright protection." 5 Because most works of architec-
ture do not have ornamental embellishments, and courts generally consider
structures to be useful articles, the separability analysis offers architects
little protection." 6 Furthermore, architects and other advocates of architec-
tural protection are concerned with the difficulty in distinguishing between
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (containing clause defining copyright subject matter
protection of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works clause); Shipley, supra note 3, at 398
n.18, (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)) (defining subject matter protection of pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works clause).
110. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1988) (describing subject matter protection of copyright,
including separability test protection under pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works clause);
Shipley, supra note 106, at 398 n.18 (stating that Copyright Act only protects architectural
structure to extent that structure depicts artistic features separable from structure's design);
Preliminary Report, supra note 5, at 264 (defining "useful article"); see also 17 U.S.C. §
113(b) & (c) (1988) (limiting architectural works protectable because structures, having utilitarian
purpose, are useful articles).
111. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1988) (including in § 102 of Copyright Act, pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works as protectable subject matter and in § 101 of Copyright Act,
defining pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works); supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text
(explaining use of separability test to determine protection for articles with utilitarian purpose).
112. Preliminary Report, supra note 5, at 264.
113. See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 730-31 (M.D. Pa. 1936)
(holding monuments analogous to sculptural works and, therefore, subject to full copyright
protection); Shipley, supra note 3, at 404 n.48 (stating that purely nonfunctional structures
are analogous to sculptural works and, thus, subject to copyright protection); H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976) (describing purely nonfunctional or monumental structures
as subject to full copyright protection).
114. White, supra note 81, at 71.
115. Id.
116. See Shipley, supra note 3, at 437 (1986) (stating that advocates of architectural
protection are justifiably concerned with level of difficulty in distinguishing under separability
test between article's functional and artistic features).
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an article's functional and artistic features." 7 Thus, the separability test
offers no consistent or comprehensive mode of protection for architectural
works.
Therefore, the Copyright Office is justifiably concerned with the possible
disadvantages of adopting a do-nothing policy about protection of architec-
tural structures." ' Inaction not only will leave architects without protection
for their structures, but also will leave United States copyright protection
in noncompliance with international standards."19 Currently, United States
protection for architectural works falls short of the international standard
of protection expounded by the Berne Convention.'2" In fact, the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Berne Adherence concluded that present United States
methods of protection for architectural works fall to meet the Berne
Convention standards.'?' International compliance with the Berne Conven-
tion is important for the United States because the Convention operates on
the principles of reciprocal national treatment for foreign artists.'1 The
Convention also imposes minimum standards for protection.'2 Nations that
are parties to the Convention must grant protection at a level not below
that which the Convention mandates.I 24 Thus, the Convention implies that
to meet the Berne Convention's minimum standards, adhering countries
must sacrifice their rigid national conceptions of copyright by bending their
117. See id. (discussing concerns of architectural protectionists over level of difficulty in
applying copyright separability test).
118. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 225-26 (expressing concern that fourth
option of doing nothing to amend Copyright Act leaves open possibility of conflicting theories
of protection as well as possibility of inadequate subject matter protection for works of
architecture); supra notes 97-117 and accompanying text (explaining disadvantages of alternative
modes of architectural protection).
119. See infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text (discussing Ad Hoc Working Group's
conclusion that United States copyright law is not in compliance with Berne Convention with
respect to structures as works of architecture).
120. See Sandison, supra note 66, at 114 (stating that United States copyright protection
does not meet Berne Convention standards for buildings and other works of architecture);
Final Report of Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention,
reprinted in 10 CoLUM. J.L. & ARTs 513, 603 (1986) [hereinafter Final Report] (stating that
United States copyright protection falls short of Berne standards with respect to architectural
works).
121. See Preliminary Report, supra note 5, at 260 (concluding that United States copyright
protection is consistent with Berne Convention in subject matter with apparent exception of
works of architecture); Final Report, supra note 120, at 603 (maintaining preliminary report
finding that United States subject matter protection fails short of Berne with respect to works
of architecture).
122. See E. PLOmAN & L. HAmILTON, COPYRIGHT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFOR-
MATIoN AGE 49 (1980) (stating that Berne Convention operates on principle of reciprocal
national treatment). The Berne Convention protects foreign works and foreign authors in each
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internal legislation to meet internationally recognized rules. 12 Hence, if the
United States does not meet the minimum obligations of the Berne Con-
vention, the United States cannot expect to reap the financial rewards of
Berne Convention protection in other nations.
126
Furthermore, the Berne Convention represents the international law on
copyright protection. 2 7 United States law requires United States courts to
interpret congressional legislation so as to not conflict with international
law. 12 Such interpretation of United States law is difficult when United
States law is in such disparity to the international law under the Berne
Convention. 29 When United States law directly conflicts with international
law, as it currently does in the area of architectural copyright, United States
courts cannot give credence to the Supreme Court's admonishment that
international law is part of United States law. 130 Also, under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the United States has a duty to perform
treaty obligations, such as those that the United States assumed in adopting
the Berne Convention, in good faith."' Finally, a violation of international
125. Id. at 49. But see Preliminary Report, supra note 5, at 188 (stating that Berne
Convention has no procedure for reviewing adhering countries' actual compliance with Berne's
minimum standards). The international bureau that administers Berne under Article 24 of the
Convention has no procedure for reviewing instruments of accession to determine compatibility
with Berne's minimum standards. Preliminary Report, supra note 5, at 188. Consequently, the
Convention has not rejected any instrument of accession on the ground of incompatibility. Id.
126. See E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, supra note 122, at 49 (stating that Berne nations
will respect foreign copyrights of foreign artists). The United States joined the Berne Convention
to obtain the highest available level of international copyright protection for United States
artist, authors, and copyright holders. Presidential Remarks on Signing the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1405 (Oct. 31, 1988) [hereinafter
Presidential Remarks]. According to U.S. News and World Report, Nov. 14, 1988, at 50, the
United States International Trade Commission estimated that foreign noncompliance with
United States copyrights had cost as much as $61 billion annually in lost revenues, profits and
royalties. DuBoff, Caplan, supra note 5, at 42. According to then President Ronald Reagan,
the entertainment industry may have lost more than $2 billion in revenues and the computer
and software industry more. than $4 billion in revenues in 1986 alone because foreign nations
failed to enforce American copyrights against international pirates. Presidential Remarks, at
1405. Consequently, public pressure mounted for United States accession to the Berne Con-
vention. R. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RiGHTS, IssUas AND CorrOVERSmS
7 (1987).
127. See R. BENKo, supra note 126, at 5 (describing Berne Convention as oldest and most
comprehensive international copyright treaty).
128. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating
that courts must never construe act of Congress to violate law of nations if any other
construction is possible).
129. See Final Report, supra note 120, at 603 (stating that United States law is not
compatible with Berne Convention with respect to buildings and other works of architecture).
130. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). In The Paquete Habana Justice
Gray stated, "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice ... as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination." Id.
131. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/
27 (mandating that nations perform treaty obligations in good faith). Article 26 codifies the
international principle of pacta sunt servanda, stating that every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. Id.
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law renders the United States subject to suit in an international forum by
the offended nation. 3 2 Consequently, the United States should make every
effort to adhere to Berne standards and, thereby, comply with international
law.
In sum, none of the four Copyright Office options merit Congressional
approval because the options fail to offer a satisfactory level of protection
for architectural structures. The Copyright Office, however, correctly asserts
that the approach of doing nothing leaves open the possibility of insufficient
subject matter protection and conflicting theories of architectural protec-
tion.' Consequently, Congress must take action to protect architecture and
bring the United States into compliance with the Berne Convention.
34
Indeed, the Copyright Office ultimately recommends that Congress hold
additional hearings and give further serious consideration to enacting ad-
ditional protection for works of architecture. 5
Congress, in conducting additional hearings, should give serious consid-
eration to an additional option. To provide proper protection to architectural
works, Congress should borrow an idea from the film industry, which,
prompted by the process of colorization, successfully lobbied in 1988 for
protection of cinematic works under the National Film Preservation Act.
36
Under the Act, the National Film Preservation Board protects twenty-five
films annually against material alteration by naming the twenty-five films
to the National Film Registry. 37 The Board annually chooses twenty-five
132. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF Tmn FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 3 (1965) (stating that treaty violation is grounds for international suit by offended state);
see also L. HENKiN, R. PuGH, 0. SCHACTER & H. SMrT, INTERNATioNAL LAW: CASES &
MATmIALS 115 (1980) (discussing adjudication of treaty violations through use of international
forums).
133. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 225-26 (stating that doing nothing to
provide increased architectural protection leaves open possibility of conflicting theories of
architectural protection as well as possibility of insufficient subject matter protection for
architecture).
134. See generally Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 226 (stating that Copyright
Office expresses no preference for particular solution, legislative or otherwise, to provide
architectural protection).
135. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at 226 (recommending that Congress
hold additional hearings and give further consideration to enacting additional protection for
works of architecture).
136. See National Film Preservation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat. 1782,
2 U.S.C. § 178 (1988) [hereinafter National Film Preservation Act] (creating Film Preservation
Board to protect 25 films annually against material alterations). See generally Renberg, The
Money of Color: Film Colorization and the 100th Congress, 11 HI.STNGS Comm./ENT. L. J.
391 (1989) (discussing legal and legislative impediments to passage of National Film Preservation
Act); Schwartz, The National Film Preservation Act of 1988: A Copyright Case Study in the
Legislative Process, 36 J. COPYRiGHT Soc'y 138 (1989) (detailing legislative history of National
Film Preservation Act in 100th Congress); Swyrydenko, Film Artists Bushiwacked by the
Coloroids: One Hundredth Congress to the Rescue? 22 AKRoN L. REv. 359 (1989) (discussing
initial legislative remedies to prevent colorization of films).
137. National Film Preservation Act, supra note 136, § 178(b); see Schwartz, supra note
136, at 156 (stating that National Film Preservation Act protects 25 films annually by naming
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films that are culturally, historically, or aesthetically significant for inclusion
in the National Film Registry.
38
Adoption of the National Film Preservation Act, while a seemingly
innocuous amendment to the Interior Appropriations Act for fiscal year
1989, had a profound impact on defining copyright in the United States. 39
The important issues that the amendment addressed included not only
colorization, but also material alteration to an artistic work, moral rights,
and even United States adherence to the Berne Convention.'4° In previous
years, Congress had examined extensively the controversial issue of moral
rights in the context of United States adherence to Berne.14 But the
congressional strategy was to keep the issue of moral rights separate from
the enabling legislation permitting United States adherence to the Berne
Convention. 42 Therefore, United States Representative Richard Gephardt
introduced subsequent legislation to provide moral rights for film artists,
which Congress subsequently rejected. 43 But the National Film Preservation
Act, by limiting its scope to twenty-five annual designates, was able to
implement drastic changes in copyright law, including the moral right
prohibition against material alteration, over the objection of many key
members of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the committee with
jurisdiction over copyright matters.'" Thus, although the Act may not have
fleshed out many of the issues in the larger legislative battle over moral
rights, the Film Preservation Act prevented a confrontational legislative
battle in Congress by circumventing the volatile issue of moral rights and,
instead, adopting a limited approach to film protection.'
4
1
Advocates of architectural protection should adopt a similarly limited
approach in order to circumvent hostile congressional reactions, and, hence,
congressional inaction. Under a proposal similar to that of the National
films to National Film Registry). Protection against material alteration of films in the original
Mrazek-Yates amendment that called for a National Film Preservation Act was changed to
protection against material alteration of films unless the film contained a labeling description
of the alteration. Id. at 147.
138. National Film Preservation Act, supra note 136 at §§ 178(a), (b); see Schwartz, supra
note 136, at 156 (stating that National Film Preservation Board chooses annually for protection
25 culturally, historically, or aesthetically significant films).
139. See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 138 (emphasizing importance of National Film
Preservation Act on United States intellectual property law, although expenditure amounted
to only $250,000 of $9.9 billion appropriations act).
140. See id. (emphasizing importance of National Film Preservation Act beyond issue of
colorization, to include moral rights issue and United States adherence to Berne Convention).
141. Schwartz, supra note 136, at 139.
142. Id.
143. See 1d. at 140 (describing Rep. Gephardt's unsuccessful attempt to enact Film Integrity
Act of 1987, which would have provided moral rights legislation for film artists).
144. See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 140-41 (detailing passage of Mrazek-Yates amend-
ment creating National Film Preservation Act over objections of Committee on Judiciary).
145. See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 140-41 (describing film preservation proponents'
strategy of avoiding confrontation over moral rights by adopting limited approach to film
protection).
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Film Preservation Act's protection of cinematic works, Congress annually
could protect a limited number of the most deserving architectural struc-
tures. 1' 6 Selection of the limited protection proposal's annual designates
would not fall under the domain of either the Copyright or Patent and
Trademark Offices, but would be decided by an independent architectural
protection board, similar to the National Film Preservation Board. 47 Al-
though the original bill for the National Film Preservation Act proposed to
amend the Copyright Act to create the Film Preservation Board, the final
amendment did not touch the Act, creating a Board independent of the
Copyright Office. 1 " Similarly, by divorcing the architectural board from
the Copyright Office, Congress need not amend the Copyright Act to
effectuate the limited protection proposal for architecture. 49 The composi-
tion of the architectural protection board can similarly mirror that of the
National Film Preservation Board.1so Under the National Film Preservation
Act, film protection decisions are left to the National Film Preservation
Board, composed of thirteen individuals selected from thirteen separately
designated organizations with an interest in the film industry.'5' The archi-
tectural protection board might include representatives from the Frank Lloyd
Wright Foundation and the American Institute of Architects as interested
parties from the architectural industry.
52
While the original amendment proposed to have the Film Protection
Board operate under authority of the Interior Department before moving
the Board to the Library of Congress because of the Library's ready supply
of films, 53 the architectural board could remain under the authority of the
146. See infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text (outlining current method of protection
for cinematic works).
147. See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 154-55 (outlining independence of National Film
Preservation Board decisions from Copyright Office). Originally, the National Film Preservation
Board was to operate within the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities under
the Department of the Interior. Id. at 142-43. Through various amendments of the National
Film Preservation Act, however, the Board shifted from the Interior Department, to the
Smithsonian Institution, to the Patent and Trademark Office, to the National Endowment for
the Arts, and, finally, to the Library of Congress. Id. at 149. The Library of Congress was
chosen because of its ready vault of film holdings. Id. at 154. The Library of Congress' film
collection consists of 75,000 titles and is the largest motion picture collection in the United
States and one of the largest collections in the world. Id.
148. National Film Preservation Act, supra note 136, § 178(g); see Schwartz, supra note
136, at 141-42 (stating that original Mrazek-Yates bill to create National Film Preservation
Act proposed to amend Copyright Act under title 17).
149. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (stating that National Film Preservation
Board exists independently from Copyright Office).
150. See infra note 151 and accompanying text (describing composition of National Film
Preservation Board).
151. Schwartz, supra note 136, at 156-57.
152. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at Appendix C (including comments
from both Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation and American Institute of Architects as interested
parties in architectural protection).
153. See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 149 (stating that jurisdiction over Film Commission
was moved from Interior Department, to Smithsonian Institution, to Patent and Trademark
Office, to National Endowment for Arts, and, finally, to Library of Congress).
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Interior Department, with the Secretary of the Interior appointing the board
members for two-year terms. 54 And, while Congress opted for twenty-five
designates for the film industry, Congress could alter this number for the
architectural industry. 55 Congress should select a number high enough to
sufficiently exhibit the desire to offer national protection for architectural
structures that are works of art, yet limited enough not to effect dislocations
in the construction industry caused by halting modifications to existing
structures or severely to prohibit architects from borrowing structural ideas
in the public domain. 56
Such a limited protection approach to architecture is similar in scope
to that of the Copyright Office's third option, 57 as copyright law under
this proposal would protect only a limited number of unique architectural
structures. 5 8 Like the third option, this limited protection proposal unfor-
tunately leaves a broad class of architectural structures unprotected. 5 9 Unlike
the third option, however, the limited protection proposal does not abolish
the separability test Congress intended and the courts employ to prevent
copyright from encroaching on patent domain.16' Some buildings still could
obtain limited protection under the separability test. 161 Therefore, by not
eliminating the separability test, courts can maintain the distinction between
copyright and design patent protection, with copyright protecting artistic
features and patent protecting utilitarian design. 62
Finally and most importantly, as a trade-off for the limited scope of
architectural protection, the limited protection proposal should offer archi-
154. See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 150-51 (describing initial proposal that Secretary
of Interior appoint members of Film Preservation Board).
155. See National Film Preservation Act, supra note 136, § 178(b) (setting 25 as adequate
number of films for Film Preservation Board annually to protect).
156. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (detailing architectural remedies that
would disrupt construction industry, including injunctions and demolition of infringing con-
structions); Copyright Office Report, supra note 8, at Appendix C (comment of Francis X.
Aryan) (expressing concern that architects need to rely to extent on copying to enhance
creativity).
157. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing scope of protection for
architecture under Copyright Office's third option to provide architectural protection).
158. See National Film Preservation Act, supra note 136, § 178(b) (setting 25 as adequate
number of films subject to annual protection); supra note 155 and accompanying text
(suggesting that number of annually protectable architectural structures could vary from number
chosen for films).
159. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (expressing concern that subject matter
protection under Copyright Office's third proposal for architectural protection is not broad
enough for works of architecture).
160. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (proposing to abolish separability test
for copyright protection under pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works clause in Copyright
Office's third proposal for architectural protection).
161. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (explaining that certain architectural
structures can receive copyright protection under separability test of Copyright Act's pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works clause).
162. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (detailing need for separability test to
prevent copyright protection of structural design); supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text
(discussing patent law protection of works with utilitarian design).
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tects moral rights protection.163 Copyright then would protect the annual
designates against modification, distortion, or demolition. 64 Consequently,
the building owner could not, for example, build a wing from New York's
Guggenheim Museum. 65 Furthermore, the proposal opens the door to moral
rights protection for other art forms in the United States by taking a step
forward in the United States evolving attitude on intellectual property.
66
Works of architecture, in addition to cinematic works, would have the
distinction of being among the first recipients of this moral rights protection
in the United States. 67 But, like the National Film Preservation Act, this
limited protection proposal for architecture would be only a first step, with
further adoption of moral rights necessary to grant to United States archi-
tects and artists the European level of protection that they desire.
6
1
Unfortunately, the moral rights protection of the limited protection
proposal remains the decisive difference between the European and United
States levels of copyright protection. 69 And, because architects expect to
have a right of integrity in their work, the moral rights dispute accounts
for the omission of structural architectural protection in the 1988 amend-
ments to the United States Copyright Act. 170 Although United States acces-
163. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text (expressing need for moral rights
protection in field of architecture).
164. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing lack of copyright protection
for architect's exclusive rights of paternity and integrity); cf. supra note 31 and accompanying
text (placing limitations on architect's exclusive rights over demolition and modification).
165. See Proposal to Include Architectural Works Under Copyright, 18 LIaR. HoTrM 4
(1989) (stating that Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation already has submitted applications for
selected Wright designs, including New York's Guggenheim Museum, to Copyright Office in
anticipation of future copyright protection).
166. See generally White, The Colorization Dispute: Moral Rights Theory as a Means of
Judicial and Legislative Reform, 38 EMoRY L.J. 237 (1989) (presenting arguments in film
colorization dispute, including exploration of several existing legal theories that incorporate
moral rights into argument against modification).
167. See generally id. (discussing initial provision for limited moral rights protection that
National Film Preservation Act offers American artists).
168. See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 141 (quoting concession of Rep. Mrazek, chief
sponsor of National Film Preservation Act, that film preservation act was only first step in
expanding intellectual property protection).
169. See R. BENKo, supra note 126, at 6 (discussing controversy surrounding moral rights
issue in United States copyright law). United States copyright law is based on the Anglo-
American tradition of economic and property rights. Id. Inclusion of a moral rights provision
in the 1928 Rome text of the Berne Convention became the first stumbling block to United
States accession to the Convention and remains the decisive difference between United States
copyright protection and international protection under Berne. DuBoff, Caplan, supra note 5,
at 41. Article 6 of Berne states that an author, after transfer of a work, shall have the right
to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work that would prejudice
the author's honor or reputation. Preliminary Report, supra note 5, at 214. The United States
Berne Implementation Act explicitly declared that United States adherence to Berne in no way
granted any right of an author of a work to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other
modification that would prejudice the author's honor or reputation. Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
170. See supra note 169 (discussing United States refusal to adopt Berne Convention
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sion to the Berne Convention was a momentous occasion for all United
States artists, architects included, the accomplishment did not compensate
American artists, especially architects, for Congress' refusal to amend the
Copyright Act to include a moral rights provision. 17 Current United States
participation in Berne fails to secure the highest available level of interna-
tional copyright protection for United States architects, artists, authors, and
copyright holders because of Congress' refusal to adopt Berne moral rights
provisions. 72 The United States must move towards adopting moral rights
protection to bring United States copyright law into compliance with the
international standards of the Berne Convention. By extending United States
protection into the field of moral rights, the United States can take a
quantum leap towards reaching what authorities recognize as "Berne's
standard par excellence.' ' 7 3 Then the United States will have reached a
higher level of intellectual property protection.7 4
Currently, United States copyright law does not protect adequately
works of architecture.175 United States accession to the Berne Convention
alone did not grant United States architects a European level of copyright
protection, and, thus, did not bring the United States into international
compliance. 176 United States artists, writers, and architects need changes in
current United States copyright law to obtain paternity rights in their
creations because the Berne enabling legislation failed to provide this pro-
standard of moral rights); supra note 32 (discussing architect's expectation of moral rights
protection under United States copyright).
171. See Renberg, supra note 136, at 420-21 (stating that although United States accession
to Berne was momentous occasion for United States artists, accession did nothing to provide
United States artists with moral rights protection).
172. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988) (declaring that adherence to Berne in no'way granted any right of author of work
to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification that would prejudice author's
honor or reputation); cf. Presidential Remarks, supra note 126, at 1405 (declaring that United
States membership in Berne Convention secures highest available level of international copyright
protection for United States artists, authors, and copyright holders).
173. See Sandison, supra note 66, at 119 (quoting Judge Wyzanski who stated that
development of international copyright resembles rising staircase, from bottom step of non-
protection to top step where Berne's "standard par excellence" prevails).
174. See Presidential Remarks, supra note 126 (stating that United States membership in
Berne secures highest available level of international copyright protection).
175. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating that copyright protects architectural
drawings, but not structures); Sandison, supra note 66, at 114 (stating that United States
copyright is compatible with Berne except in protection of works of architecture). The report
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Berne Adherence concluded that United States copyright
law is compatible with Berne in subject matter with the exception of buildings and other works
of architecture. Preliminary Report, supra note 5, at 260; Final Report, supra note 120, at
603.
176. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (expressing need for amendment to bring
United States architectural protection into compliance with Berne); Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988, supra note 172, at § 2 (stating that Berne is not self executing on
United States, meaning that United States adherence to Berne only adopts Berne provisions
to extent that provisions are compatible with United States Copyright Act).
1126
1990] COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR ARCHITECTURE
tection.'7 The emphasis in copyright must shift from economic rights to
moral rights in order to meet architects' demands for structural protection.
78
The four options that the Copyright Office outlines for architectural pro-
tection fail to offer a satisfactory solution given current United States
attitudes on intellectual property rights. 179 Adopting a protection proposal
similar to that granted to the film industry will protect the most deserving
architectural structures while expanding moral rights into the fabric of
American intellectual property theory.180 Only by taking these gradual steps
can the United States ascend the staircase to the heightened intellectual




177. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (citing request of Frank Lloyd Wright
Foundation for protection of paternity rights).
178. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (stating that United States copyright law
focuses on economic and property rights).
179. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (stating that United States copyright law
focuses on economic rights rather than moral rights).
180. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing United States reluctance to
adopt moral rights protections for American artists).
181. See supra note 173 (describing copyright protection as rising staircase at top of which
Berne's standard par excellence prevails).
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